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of the

STATE OF UTAH
ROSE GIBBONS AND AUSTIN K. TIERNAN,
Appellants,

vs.
R. G. FRAZIER AND UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
A Corporation,
Respondents.

No. 4378

Respondents' Brief
STATEMENT

The complaint in this action is in ejectment simply.
Thereby it is alleged merely that the plaintiffs, appellants here, together with one Michael Gibbons and one
Stephen Hays, were the owners and entitled to the
possession of a tract of land in the Town of Bingham
1

Canyon in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as Lot
10, Block 4, Pia t "A", Wilkes Official Survey of Bingham Townsite, and that the defendants, respondents
here, were in possession thereof and wrongfully withheld possession from plaintiffs; wherefore plaintiffs
demanded judgment for possession.
The defendants, respondents here, by their answer
denied that the plaintiffs, either togethrr with or apart
from any other person or persons, were owners or entitled to the possession of said premises or had any
right, title or interest therein, and admitted that respondents were in possession thereof and withheld
possession thereof from plaintiffs' against plaintiffs'
demand as respondents had a right to do. Further
answering the complaint the defendants alleged three
affirmative defemes, each in itself conclusive against
appellants: (1) 'That the defendant Utah Copper
Company was seized in fee simple and entitled to the
possession of said premises; ( 2) that the defendants
and their predecessors had been in continuous possession of said premises under claim of title exclusive of
all other right, adversely to the pretended title of the
plaintiffs, for more than twenty-five years last past
before the commencement of said action and had paid
all taxes that had been levied and assessed upon said
land and improvements according to law during said
period-the plea of the statute of limitations to plaintiffs' suit at law, the plea of laches not being available
2

to respondents against the form of action selected by
plaintiffs; and (3) an estoppel resulting from the continuous, open, notorious and adverse possession of said
premises by the defendants and their predecessors over
said period, the sale and conveyance from one to the
other and the substantial improvement of said premises
by defendants and their predecessors and the devotion
thereof over said period to the purposes of a hospital
for the care and treatment of the sick and injured of
the Town of Bingham Canyon and in the vicinity therl}of, all of which was at all times within plaintiffs'
knowledge, but that plaintiffs' had allowed said several
occupants to purchase the premises, possess and improve the same without any manner of protest, notice,
claim or aSSl)rtion of title thereto.
The court below found generally in favor of the
defendants:
(1) That the defendant Utah Copper
Company was seized in fee simple and entitled to the
possession of said premises without any right or title
thereto being vested in the plaintiffs; (2) that the defendants and their predecessors at the time of the commencement of said action had been in continuous
possession of said premises, holding the same under
claim of title in fee simple, exclusive of all other right,
adversely to the pretended title of the plaintiffs, for
more than forty-fin~ years then last past and that the
defendants, their predecessors and grantors, had paid
all taxes that had been levied and assessed against said
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land and the improvements thereupon according to law
during the thirty years of said period then last past and
the whole thereof; and (3) that in the year 1878 or 1880
one S. S. Maxwell entered into the possession of said
premises, erected a cabin thereupon and constructeJ
a rock wall along the southerly boundary of said premises, and from said date continued in the possession of
said premises under claim of title in fee simple, exclusive of all other right, adversely to the pretended
title of the plaintiffs ancl their predecessors and grantors, to and until May 26, 1899, when the said S. S. Maxwell conveyed the same to one F. E. Straup, who continued in like exclusive and adverse possession until
the 8th day of May, 1901, when he conveyed said prem
ises to one Charles MoCann; and said Charles McCann
thereafter continued in like exclusive, adverse possession to and until the 5th day of October, 1904, when he
conveyed said premises to one A. L. Castleman, who
thereupon entered into possession thereof and continued
in the exclusive, adverse possession under claim of title
in fee simple until the 30th day of March, 1907, moved
the cabin theretofore erected by said S. S. Maxwell to
the rear of said lot and erected thereupon an additional
two-story frame building at the cost of $4,000.00, and
devoted said building and premises to the purposes of
residence and a hospital for the care and treatment of
the sick and injured in the Town of Bingham Can~·on
and in the vicinity thereof; that upon the 30th day of
4

March, 1907, A. L. Castleman conveyed said premises
to one C. N. Ray, who thereupon entered into the possession thereof and continued in the open, notorious and
adverse possession to the 30th day of June, 1913, adding to said two-story frame residence, constructed upon
said premises by said A. L. Castleman, four rooms at
a cost of approximately $2,000.00 and C. N. Ray
thereafter devoted said premises and the improvements
thereon to the purposes of residence and hospital for
the care of the sick and injured of the Town of Bingham and in the vicinity thereof; that on the 30th day
of June, 1913, C. N. Ray, conveyed said premises to
Drs. Davison H. Ray and Bernardo S. 0 'Brien, who
entered into and continued in the open, notorious, exclusive and adverse possession thereof to and until the
19th day of April, 1917, when said Bernardo S. O'Brien
conveyed his interest therein to Davison H. Ray, the
latter continuing in such open, exclusive and adverse
possession and devoting said premises to said purposes
of residence and hospital until his death on the 26th day
of June, 1920; that thereupon his estate was probated
and said premises distributed to Elizabeth K. Ray, the
widow of decedent, who continued in the open, exclusive
and adverse possession thereof until the 21st day of
November, 1922, when she conveyed the same, warranting title thereto to the defendant R. G. Frazier, who
thereupon entered into the possession of said premisetl
as the sole and exclusive owner thereof and so continued
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until the 20th day of September, 1924, when that defendant conveyed the same and warranted title thereto to the defendant Utah Copper Company; and that
the defendant R. G. Frazier during the period of his
occupancy, until the destruction of said improvements
by fire in the month of September, 1924, devoted said
improvements and premises to said residence and hospital uses; and that the defendant Utah Copper Company upon the conveyance to it of said premises entered into the possession thereof, employed architects and
let contracts for the erection thereupon of a hospital
building of a magnitude equal to the needs of said
Town of Bingham and vicinity, entered upon the construction thereof on the 23rd day of September, 1924,
and thereafter completed the same on the lOth day of
April, 1925, at a cost of $23,000.00, and said structure
has since the completion thereof been devoted to the
care and treatment of the sick and injured of the Town
of Bingham and vicinity requiring its facilities. And
the court further found that said several conveyances
were made and said several grantees entered into and
continued in said open, notorious and exclusive possession in the belief and under claim of title against the
plaintiffs and all the world, was upon said several
occasions and at all times since has been \vithin the
knowledge of the plaintiffs, and that said S. S. Maxwell and said several grantees improved said premises
by the erection thereupon of said structures and said
6

additions thereto without notice or knowledge that the
plaintiffs had or claimed any title or interest in or to
said premises and said plaintiffs and each thereof stood
by, although possessed of said knowledge, awl allowc(l
said several occupants to purchase said premises,
possess and improve the same, as aforesaid, without
any manner of protest, notice, claim or assertion of
title to said premises or against said occupants of
grantees or any thereof until a certain notice by plaintiffs' counsel herein by letter addressed to the defendant R. G. ]'razier and dated the 30th day of October,
1924, which notice was received by the defendant
_F'razier more than a month after architects had been
employed, contracts let and the construction of said
hospital structure had been actually begun by the defendant Utah Copper Company.
Upon said findings of fact the court below made
its conclusions of law: (1) That plaintiff's actiou was
barred by the provisions of Sections 6449 and 6450,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917; (2) that plaintiffs were
estopped from claiming title to said lands and premises or improvements thereupon; (3) that the defendant Utah Copper Company was the owner in fee simple
absolute of said premises and that plaintiffs had neither
right, title nor interest therein of any kind or character;
and ( 4) that plaintiffs had not proved a cause of action
against defendants and that the latter were entitled to
a judgment of dismissal and to their costs. Judgment
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of dismissal was accordingly entered and the case comes
to this court on the appeal therefrom by the plaintiffs
below.
Appellants claim an undivided interest in a placer
mining claim in Bingham Canyon, Salt Lake County,
Utah, known as the McGuire & Company's Placer Mining Claim, U. S. Lot No. 242. This placer claim is in
conflict with what is commonly known in Bingham a~J
the Valentine Scrip, the latter being identical with the
West half of the East half of the Northwest quarter of
Section 26, Township 3 South, Range 3 West, S. L.
B. & M. The name Valentine Scrip attached to that
forty acre tract becauuse it was purchased with Valoitine Scrip-it was not a mineral entry. The premises,
the possession of which is sought by action, lay
upon that part of the placer mining claim m
conflict with the Valentine Scrip. Attention is directed
to the tracing admitted in evidence below as Exhibit
B, upon which the premises herein involved and the
relation thereof to the placer mining claim and the
Valentine Scrip will be readily observed.
McGuire & Company's Placer Mining Claim, U. S.
Lot No. 242 was
Located August 26, 1875, (Notice of Location
recorded in the records of the mining district
August 26, 1875, and in the office of the
County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah,
February 13, 1880), (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A,
Abstract of Title, Entry No. 1),
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Entered, (date of payment of purchase price and
issuance of receiver's receipt) May 28, 1880,
Patent issued July 30, 1881 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A,
Abstract of Title, ]Jntry No. 4).
The Valentine Scrip was
Located, paid for and entered February 9, 1876,
patent issued July 10, 1876, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, Abstract of Title, Entry No. 28).
Appellants claim title through the locators and patentees of the McGuire & Company's placer mining rlaim.
The respondents show a good record title to the premises herein involved from the entryman and patentee
of the Valentine Scrip, as well as having proved against
appellants a good title by adverse possession and having established as against appellants an estoppel that
now precludes their asserting their pretended title
, against these respondents.
ARGUMENT.

I.
Point.
The legal title to the property for the possession of
which appellants sue in ejectment is in the respondent, Utah
Copper Company, wherefore the judgment of dismissal made
and entered by the court belorw should be affirmed.

Ejectment is purely a legal action and recovery
therein must be predicated upon a legal title-a mere
equitable title will not support a judgment. The action
9

can be maintained only on a showing of existing legal
title in appellants. Appellants' case will accordingly
stand or fall as that issue may be determined for or
against them-no equity can aid them. They have
elected to stand upon their legal title, no doubt
appreciating the fact that equitable relief would be
denied them, barred by some fifty years laches, were
they otherwise entitled to equitable relief. Appellants
must succeed, if at all, by the strength of their own title
-not by the weakness of that of their adversaries.
The placer mining claim wherein lies appellants'
interest, if any they have, was located as such August
26, 1875; the Valentine Scrip was located, entered and
paid for less than six months thereafter, but more than
four years and a quarter before payment was made for,
or receiver's receipt issued upon, the placer claim. Patent actually issued upon the Valentine Scrip July 10,
1876, nearly four years before payment was made for,
or receiver's receipt issued upon, the placer claim and
nearly five years before patent issued upon the placer
claim. The Valentine Scrip patent was recorded in
the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake
County, Utah, July 25, 1876, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A,
Abstract of Title, Entry No. 28), nearly four years before payment was made for, or receiver's receipt issued
upon, the placer claim and five years before the patent
issued upon the placer claim.

The government by

issuing its patent upon the Valentine Scrip divested it10

self of the legal title thereto. Five years later, when
the government issued its patent upon the placer mining claim, it conveyed no title to the area in confliet
with the Valentine Scrip, because it had none to convey,
having already parted therewith by patent upon the
Valentine Scrip.
"At any rate * * * it (the government)
could not convey property which had already
passed to others. A patent of the government
cannot, any more than a deed of an individual,
transfer what the grantor does not possess.'' (P.
25, Appellants' Brief).
The question is not now as to whether or not the
Valentine Scrip was when entered or patented known
mineral land, nor whether or not the government had
been imposed upon by the Valentine Scrip entryman
and by fraudulent and false affidavits been induced to
conclude the land non-mineral, unoccupied and open to
entry and had been prevailed upon to issue the Valentine Scrip patent accordingly, nor whether or not the
government had been misled by the failure of the placer
patentees to include iu their abstract of title the prior
patent to the Valentine Scrip, then actually of record,
or to otherwise inform the government with reference
thereto, nor whether or not it was merely an oversight
all around. This is not a suit to set aside tho senior
patt>nt and establish in lieu thereof the junior patent,
nor is it one to have respondents declared trustee of the
11

legal title to appellants' usc-appellants seek no equitable relief. Their suit is in ejectment. Appellants'
cause must stand or fall by their legal title and the
strength thereof.

vVe may perhaps he pardoned for

being so insistent upon this distinction, because appellants are so perverse in avoiding it and confusing the
discussion by assuming determinations of fact to be had
only in an equitable action to avoid the senior patent or
for declarations of trust while, at the same time, prosecuting their action as one at law wherein the defense
of laches, otherwise available to respondents and conclusive against appellants, is denied respondents.
Mr .•Justice .B'ield said in the case of Patterson v.
Tatum, 3 Saw. 164, 18 Feel. Cases, at page 1331:
''A patent is the instrument hy which tbc
government, whether State or National, passe~
its title; it is the government conveyance. But,
if the government possess at the time no t:tle,
none passes by its execution. It is of itself
evidence of title, only because government being
the original source of title, the presumption of
law is that the title remained with the government until some other disposition of it is shown.
But, if an earlier patent is produced, the subsequent one ceases to have any operation. The title
passing by the first conveyance is not affected
by the second until the first is got out of the
way. If the first was issued from improper motives, corrupt actions, erroneous vic~ws of duty,
or mistaken consideration, as to matter of fact
or law by the officers of the government to whom
the execution and issue of patents is intrusted,
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a court of law can afford no remedy to the second patentee; he must resort to a court of equity
for relief. So, also, if particular facts respecting
the condition or location of the property must
be previously ascertained and determined by a
special tribunal appointed for that purpose, and
that tribunal has come to erroneous conclusions
upon which the patent has issued, such conclusions cannot be questioned collaterally, alHl the
patent be thereby invalidated in the action of
Pjectment. ReliPf in such cases can only be afforded by a direct proceeding by bill, information, or
scire facias, either to revoke the first patent, or
restrain its operation, or to subject, where equitable grounds exist, the lanu to certain trusts in
the first patentee's hands. A court of law in an
action of ejectment cannot listen to any objections founded upon such considerations * * * "
In Hayner 'T· Stanly, 1:3 Fed. 217, Mr . •Justice
Sawyer, after quoting with approval from 1fr. Justice
Field's opinion just referred to, continued:
"This language covers tbe case at bar in all
particulars. The title passed to Martin by the
first patent, and there was nothing left upon
which the second patent could operate. Conceding, for the purposes of the argument, that the
patent was erroneously given to Martin, when it
ought to have gone to the subsequent claimants
and patentees, the title, nevertheless, passed; and
the only remedy of the injured parties is in
equity to charge Martin and his grantors, if
there are ef!uital)le grounds for so doing, ·with a
trust for their benefit. The legal title 1s m
Martin, and that must control in ejectment.
'' * * '~ the inquiry now is, not which
party ought in fact and in law to have received

1._,•)

the title, hut which party in fact and in law
has acquired the title; and the determination of
that queRtion rests wholly upon the patents.
They go back to the United f-ltatcs, the source of
title, and the defendant has the elder patent,
regular}~! iRstwd in pnnmnnce of the law. * * * "
Sec alRo:
Bagnell v. Broderick, 1:~ Pet. (:~8 U. S.) 4:36;
I<'enn v. Holme, 21 How. ( 62 U. N.) 481;
Langdon v. Slwrwoo<l, ] 24 U. S. 74, <d 8:~.
Upon page

1]

of their brief counsel stnte their

contention to he that "when the agricnltnral 1wtent
i:::;sued to B<>nt](>y in 187fi thr United StateR had theretofore by solemn Congressional act divested itself of

Ow right to convey to Bmlil ey, so far at least as the
two estate:::; eonflict"-this on their theory that the
title by mineral patent related back to the date of the
notice of location. If by this language counsel mean to
say the United States upon the occasion of the issuance
of the Valentine Scrip patent on July 10, 1876, had
parted with its title to the area in eonflict with the
placer claim and that, thrrcfore, the United States had
110 jurisdiction ov<~r that area, havi11g partc~d ~with its
title to another, aml as to such ::trea the Valentine Scrip
patent was void, they have fnllen into that indefiniteness of exprP"sion of
sonR of 1vhich they

~whi(•.h
onl~T

we eomplnin Rnrl, for rca-

al'e aware, have avoided a

direct statement of the conditiom; upon which they
could hope to attain the Pnd they Reek. IIad the govern
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ment parted with its title to the area in conflict upon
the occasion of the issuance of the Valentine Scrip
patent 1 \Vas the government then without jurisdiction
as to that area'~ ~Was the Valentine Scrip patent as to
that area void and not merely voidable~ These questions must be amnvered in the affirmative if appellants
are to succeed, for if the United States was still vested
with the title to the area in conflict and it still had the
right or jurisdiction to investigate and determine certain facts precedent to patent, i. e., the mineral or nonmineral character of the land, whether or not it were
occupied or vaeaut and open to non-mineral: entry,
whether or not there had been a discovery of mineral,
whether or not the placer claim had been staked on the
ground and \vhether or not those things generally had
been done that the law required precedent to a valid
placer location, then appellants must fail; because although under those circumstances the issuance of the
non-mineral Valentine Scrip patent had been irregular,
in error and to a party not entitled thereto, the result of
mistake or even deliberate fraud, the title was vested
in the government, the government was not without
jurisdiction, its dealings with the land in question wen)
within its powers and in the course of duty imposed
upon its officers, the Valentine Scrip patent was void
able merely, not void, and it was when issued and always thereafter remained conclusive against collateral
attack in an action at either law or equity.

15

In Moore v. Hobbins, 96 U. S. 530, at 532, the Supreme Court of the United States held as follows upon
this subject:

'' * * * when the patent has * * *
been issued, delivered and accepted, all right to
control the title or to decide on the right to the
title has passed * * * from the Executive
Department of the government. A moment's consideration will show that this must, in the nature
of things, be so. We are speaking now of a case
in which the officers of the department have acted
within the scope of their authority. The offices
of register and receiver and commissioner are
created mainly for the purpose of supervising the
sales of the public lands; and it is a part of their
daily business to decide when a party has by purchase, by pre-emption, or by any other recognized
mode, established a right to receive from the
government a title to any part of the public domain * * * if the patent issued under the
seal of the United States, and signed by the President, is delivered to and accepted by the party,
the title of the government passes with this delivery. -with the title passes away all authority
or control of the Executive Department over the
land, and over the title which it has con-veyed. It
would be as reasonable to hold that any private
owner of land who has conveyed it to another
can, of his own volition, recall, cancel, or annul
the instrument which he has made and delivered.
If fraud, mistake, error, or wrong has been done,
the courts of justice present the only remedy.
These courts are as open to the United States to
sue for tho cancellation of the deed or reconveyance of the land as to individuals; and if the
16

government is the party injured, this IS the
proper course.
"'A patent' says the court in United States
v. Stone (2 Wall. 525), 'is the highest evidence of
title, and is conclusive as against the government
and all claiming under junior patents or titles,
until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial
tribunal. In England this was originally done
by scire facias; but a bill in chancery is found a
more convenient remedy.' "
And in St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Green,
13 Fed. 208, where the Circuit Court for the District of
Colorado entered into the following discussion of the
question,"'This Is an action of ejectment, * * *
The questions now to be considered arise upon
demurrer to the third amended answer. By this
pleading the defendants seek to attack, in this
action of ejectment, the patent under which the
plaintiff claims.
"First, that the patent was obtained by the
patentee, Mr. Starr, under whom the plaintiff
claims, by fraud, conspiracy, bribery, and perjury; * * •
''Another action of ejectment, arising upr
this identical patent, was brought in this court
some time since, and was tried here. The court
in that case admitted certain evidence ten,1ing
to show that the officers of the land departlY'c-nt
had issued the patent improperly and erronel)nS·
ly. The judgment of the court in that case has
been reversed, and an elaborate opinion pronounced by Mr. Justice Field, is now before us.
In that opinion, the doctrine is laid down so
clearly and emphatically as to leave no room for
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doubt, that, in an action of ejectment, the defendant cannot be permitted to attack a patent, evC'n
upon the ground of fraud. He must resort to r
court of equity.
''After citing numerous cases in the supreme
court of the United States, the opinion in the
case just referred to proceeds as follows:
'According to the doctrine thus expressed, and the cases cited in its support,-anil
there are none in conflict with it,-there
can be no doubt that the court below erred
in admitting the record of the proceedings
upon which the patent was issued, in order
to impeach its validity. The judgment of the
department, upon their sufficiency, was not,
as already stated, open to contestation. lf,
in issuing a patent, its officers took mistaken
views of the law, or drew erroneonuFl conclusions from the evidence, or acted from
imperfect views of their duty, or even from
corrupt motives, a court of law can afford
no remedy to a party alleging that he iR
thereby aggrieved. He must resort to a
court of equity for relief. * * *'
*
*
*
*
*
*
"Without reading further from that opmwn,
it is sufficient to say that the doctrine is fully and
elaborately discussed, and numcrom; cases are
cited as establishing the doctrine that a patent of
the United States, in an action of ejectment, cannot be collaterally attacked. * * *
''It is hardly necessary to say that an action of ejectment is pre-eminently an action in
which the legal title must prevail, and therefor•>.
one in which, according to this ruling, the patent
cannot be attacked collaterally. * * *"
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The mere filing with the Recorder of the mining
district of a notice of location of the placer mining
claim did not divest the United States of title to the
area in conflict. The character of the interest obtained
by the perfPcted, valid location of a mining claim was
defined by the Supreme Court of the United States m
Black v. Elkhorn Mining Company, 163 U. S. 445, 16
Sup. Ct. Rep. 1101, 41 L. ed. 221, as follows:
"Mr. ,Justice Miller, in the course of his
opinion in Forbes v. Gracey, (94 U. S. 762)
stated: 'It is very true that Congress has by
statutes permitted individuals to dig out and convert to their own use the ores containing the
precious metals which are found in the lands belonging to the government, without exacting or
receiving any compensation for those ores and
without requiring the. miner to buy or pay for tho
land. It has gone further, and recognized the
possessory rights of these miners, as asserted
among themselves by rules, which have become
laws of the mining districts as regards mining
claims, but in doing this it has not parted with
the title to the land except in cases where the
land has been sold in accordance with the provisions of the law upon that subject'.
''The interest in a mining claim prior to
the payment of any money for the granting of a
patent for the land, is nothing more than a right
to the exclusive possession of the land based
upon conditions subsequent, a failure to fulfill
which forfeits the locator's interest in the claim .
•, ,,, * " (Italics ours).
and in the same case in the Circuit Court of Appeals
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for the Ninth Circuit (52 Fed. 859), the decision being
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States,
it was said that it was a possessory right merely that
was conferred upon the locator of a mining claim, and
proceeded:

'' * * * Congress has also provided that
the locators of such claims may purchase the
property, and has prescribed the terms and conditions upon which the government title may be
thus acquired. Rev. St. §§ 2325-2340. But the
locator is not compelled to buy. He may never
do so. * * * In the case under consideration
no such application was made prior to the
death of the husband of the plaintiff in error.
The government's offer to sell this mining claim
had not been accepted, and no step of any natur·~
looking to the acquisition of the title of the United States thereto had been taken by the locators,
or their successors in interest, up to and for a
long time after that event. The title of the United
States was therefore then absolutely free and unincumbered. No legal reason existe<i why Congress could not then have withdrawn the property
from sale, or made any other dispOF;ition of it.
That the government, in its wisdom an<i g"·?norosity, continued to permit the locators to enjoy
the fruits of its property by extracting the minerals therefrom, and that a right thus conferred
upon and enjoyed by locators constitutes proper
ty, and property often of groat value, which is
treated by the courts and legislatures of various
states as realty in dealing with the rights of
claimants thereto as between themselves and
third parties, in no respect affect the trne title
to the property, which aU the time remained in
20

the United States' free and unincumbered, because
its offer to sell had not been accepted, and it had
done nothing to part with its title. * * *
While the possessory right to which referenc(~
has been made constituted in the locator, owning
and enjoying it, property of value, which could
be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited,
and, vve may add, forfeited by abandonment, it
constittded, and could constitute, no legal interest
or estate in the property as against the United
States or its grantee. '~ * * " (Italics ours).
"Location" has been defined as "the act or series
of acts by which the right of exclusive possession of
mineral veins and the surveys of mineral lands is vested
in the locator". Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed. Vol. 2, § 327.
To the validity of mining locations the Act of Congress
prescribes the necessary precedents of (1) discovery
and (2) the marking of the location on the ground so
that its boundaries can be readily traced. § 2, A. C.
10, 1872, R. S. § 2320, § 5 A. C. May 10, 1872, R. S.
§ 2324. The proof of recording and marking a claim
will not authorize the court to presume a discovery.

1May

Smith v. Newell, 86 Fed. 56, (Gir. Ct. D. Utah). A
single discovery within a placer location does not conclusively establish the mineral character of all the land
within it and this question is open to investigation by
the Department at any time until patent is issued.
Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed., Vol. 2, § 438. There is no
implication from patent that these essential conditions
precedent to a valid location had been performed at
21

any time prior to the issuance of receiver's final receipt, which as to the McGuire & Company's placer
claim was on May 28, 1880, four and one-half years
after the location, entry and payment for the Valentine
Scrip and nearly four years after the actual issuance
of patent upon the Valentine Scrip. What the rules of
the mining- district were or the nature of the compliance
therewith, if any, the record below does not disclose;
appellants offered no proof thereupon.
Counsel rely upon the case of Creede & Cripple
Creek Mining- & Milling Company vs. Uinta Tunnel Mining & Transportation Company, 196 U. S. :3:37, 25 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 266, 49 L. ed. 501. But it was held in that
case that the mineral patent raised no presumption as
to the date of plaintiff's discovery other than that a
discovery had been made at the time of entry, that the
mere ex parte statement as to the date of di:,;covery contained in the location notice was not evidentiary, that
without a discovery there could be no location, that
"doubtless a locator does not acquire the right of exclusive possession until he had made a valid location,
and discovery is essential to its validity'', that "an
entry, sustained by a patent, is conclusive evidence that
at the time of the entry there had been a valid location,
, and such valid location implies as one of its conditions
a discovery", and that "it must be remembered that
the discovery and the marking on the ground are not
matters of record hut in pais and, if disputed in an
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adverse suit or otherwise, must be shown, as other like
facts, by parol testimony", that "it is undoubtedly true
that discovery is the initial fact. The language of the
statute makes that plain, and parties may not go on
the public domain and acquire the right of possession
by the mere performance of the acts prescribed for a
location", that by the issuance of patents the government had made no determination as to the date of discovery other than that at the time of receiver's receipt
or entry such discovery had been made.
The mineral patent issued upon McGuire & Company's placer claim, as we have just observed, raised
no presumption of a discovery at any time prior to
entry, May 28, 1880, nor any presumption of the staking of the claim on the ground, hence no presumption
of a valid location prior to that date. Not only is there
no presumption of a valid location upon the occasion of
either entry or patent of the Valentine Scrip, but by all
the authorities the issuance of the non-mineral patent
was such an adjudication against the mineral character
of the land and of its unoccupied and unappropriated
condition as to be conclusive upon a collateral attack in
an action at either law or equity. It is such an adjudication against the mineral claimant because by the act of
Congress authorizing the issuance of the Valentine
Scrip (17 U. S. Stat. at Large, 649) it was provided
that "the claimant * * * may select and shall be
allowed patents for an equal quantity of the unoccupied
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and unappropriated public land of the United States
not mineral * * * " 'rhe issuance of the patent
upon the Valentine Scrip raises a presumption conclusive in an action at law and in all equitable actions other
than by direct attack, that ''all previous steps had been
regularly taken to justify making the patent", and an
adjudication conclusive in a suit at law, and in all
equitable actions other than by direct attack ''as to all
matters properly determinable- by the Land Department'', conclusive therefore upon the non-mineral character of the land and upon the fact that it was then unoccupied and unappropriated, a determination against
the discovery and the staking of the claim upon the
ground, both necessary under the act of Congress to it:'l
valid location as a placer claim. This determination
was within the scope of the authority of the Land Department because the government held the title, the disposition thereof was exclusively in the Land Department, whose duty it was to make all necessary investigations and determinations with reference thereto and
in the light thereof to convey the land to the one so
deemed entitled. The jurisdiction of the Land Department was invoked by the application of the non-mineral
entryman for the Valentine Scrip patent, and the duty
was imposed upon it by law to investigate and deter-·
mine whether or not the land entered was of such a
character as to permit of its purchase by Valentine
Scrip, that is to say, non-mineral, unoccupied and un24

appropriated, as to all of which the patent to the Valentine Scrip evidences the Department's final determination, conclusive against collateral attack as just stated.
As held by the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth .Circuit in United States v. Beaman, 242 Fed.
876 at 879:

" * * * A patent of the United States
is an adjudication by the quasi judicial tribunal,
the Land Department, to which the government
has intrusted the determination of the claims of
applicants for titles to the public lands, and a
conveyance of the title to the lands which the
patent describes to the patentee. It raises the
presumption of right and regularity in all the
proceedings antedating it and of perfect title in
the grantee. In the case at bar it was an adjudication of the Land Department that the land it
patented was not mineral land, and this and
every other adjudication it made that was essential to the validity of the patent was impervious
to collateral attack and presented a strong presumption that its decision was right". (Cases
cited).
And in re Wo-Gin-Up's Estate, 57 Utah 36, the Supreme Court of this state quoted with approval from
Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah 535, 11 Pac. 575, as follows:
"This court, in Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah at
page 535, 11 Pac. at page 575, quotes in support
of the conclusions reached in that case from
Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447, 1 Sup. Ct.
389, 27 L. ed. 226, as follows:
'That (the land) department, as we
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have repeatedly said, was estabilshed to supervise the various proceedings whereby a
conveyance of the title from the United
States to portions of the public domain is
obtained, and to see that the requirements of
different acts of Congress are fully complied with. Necessarily, therefore, it must
consider and pass upon the qualifications of
the applicant, the acts he has performed to
secure the title, the nature of the land,
whether it is of the class which is open to
sale. Its judgment upon these matters ~s
that of a special tribunal, and is unassailable,
except by direct proceedings for its annulment or limitation. Such has been the uniform language of this court in repeated
decisions.' ''
And in Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed., Vol. 3, page 1895, §

779:
''It has been frequently determined that the
patent is conclusive evidence of the character of
the land. If the instrument was issued pursuant
to the laws governing agricultural lands, the land
embraced therein will be conclusively presumed
to be agricultural, and if under the mining laws,
to be mineral. ·
"We have heretofore alluded to patents issued to agricultural claimants under the preemption and homestead laws, and have ohserve(l
that these laws provided that no lands on which
are situated any known salines or mines should
be liable to entry. When a patent issues to the
agricultural claimant, it would seem to be a conclusive adjudication that the lands were agricultural, contained no known mines, and the patent
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is immune from collateral attack. In other words,
agricultural patents fall within the general ruin
above stated."

It is uot now in this action a question of the correctness of the Laud Department's decision, but rather
of the Land Department's right to inquire and determine. If the Land Department's decision was in erro1'
the law provided a method of review. If the Valentine Scrip patent had been issued by the Land Department by mistake, or if that Department had been imposed upon, only a court of equity could have granted
the relief appellants are endeavoring to obtain by this
ejectment suit.

If the action is to be determined upon

equitable principles it must be made equitable in form
because appellants have waited fifty years to assert
their elaim of title and respondents should not be denied the right to avail themselves of appellants' laches
as a defense. Respondents cannot plead laches to a suit
in ejectment.
In the case of Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co.,

234 U. S. 669, 34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. ed. 1527, the court
held:
''The exclusion of mineral lands is not confined to railroad land grants, but appears in the
homestead, desert-land, timber and stone, and
other public land laws, and the settled course of
decision in respect of all of them has been that
the character of the land is a question for the
Land Department, the same as are the qualificn-
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tions of the applicants and his performance of
the acts upon which the right to receive the title
depends, and that when a patent issues it is to
be taken upon a collateral attack, as affonling
conclusive evidence of the non-mineral character
of the land and of the regularity of the acts and
proceedings resulting in its issue, and, upon a
direct attack, as affording such presumptive
evidence thereof as to require plain and convincing proof to overcome it. (Cases cited).
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
"Of course, if tho land officers are induced
by false proofs to issue a patent for mineral
lands under a non-mineral land law, or if they
issue such a patent fraudulently or through 'l
mere inadvertence, a bill in equity, on the part
of the government, will lie to annul tho patent
and regain the title, or a mineral claimant who
then had acquired s1tch rights in the land as to
entitle him to protection may maintain a bill to
have the patentee declared a trustee for him; but
such a pa.tent is merely voidable, not void,
"" "" "" " (Cases cited):

*
*
*
*
"Taking up the several questions m the
light of what we have here said, we answer them
as follows:
*
*
"2. Dioes a patent to a railroad company
under a grant which excludes mineral lands, as
in the present case, but which is issued without
any investigation upon tho part of the officers of
the Land Office or of the Department of the Interior as to the quality of the land, whether agricultural or mineral, and without hearing upon
or determination of the quality of the lands,
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operate to convey lands which are thereafter as,
certainecl to be mineral?
''ANSWER-A patent issued in such circumstances is irregularly issued, undoubtedly so;
but, as it is the act of a legally constituted
tribunal, and is done within its jurisdiction, it is
not void, and therefore passes the title * * *
subject to the right of the government to attack
the patent hy a direct suit for its annulment if
the land was known to be mineral when the patent issued * * * "
"4. If the reservation of mineral lands as
expressed in the patent is void, then is the patent upon a collateral attack, a conclusive and
official declaration that the land is agricultural,
and that all the requirements preliminary to the
issuance of the patent have been complied with~
"A ~swER-lt is conclusive upon a collateral
attack." (Italics ours).
Its jurisdiction invoked by the non-mineral entryman's application to purchase a part of the public domain, title to which was then in the United States govemmcmt, the Land Department made an investigation
to determine the character of the land applied for, aml
whether or not it was unoccupied and open to entry,
and the Land Department made its decision thereon in
favor of the non-mineral entryman. We offered in the
court belo"r (Tr. pages 13 and 14) a photostat copy
of the proceedings before the Land Department upon
the Valentine Scrip application, entry and patent, but
appellants objected to its admission and the court sus,
tained the objection upon the ground, (upon which the
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objection was made), that the Valentine Scrip patent,
the senior patent, did not require in aid of its validity
and conclusiveness the record upon which it issued, for
all presumptions of law were in favor of its validity and.
the regularity thereof. But counsel, while objecting to
the proof we tendered, asserted that the Land Department erred in finding that the land within the Valentine Scrip was non-mineral, unoccupied and open tO
entry. Whether or not the land Department erred is
not a matter that can be determined in this suit in
ejectment. That question is not in issue here. ''The
test of jurisdiction is not 'right decision,' but the right
to enter upon the inquiry and make some decision''in this instance it cannot be denied that the Department
had the right to enter upon the inquiry as to whether
or not the land applied for by the non-mineral entryman was non-mineral, unoccupied and open to entry and
make some decision. The senior patent issued and all
presumptions are against any error in the issuance
thereof upon collateral attack in an action at either law
or equity.
Section 122, 18 R. C. L., page 1221, 1s m part as
follows:
"The government is, of course, an interested
party in the determination of the character of
public land; and it has imposed the duty of
determining the mineral or non-mineral character
of public land on the land department. The question of the mineral or non-mineral character of
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public land is an open one until the acquisition
of complete title to the land. * * * In a contest between mineral and non-mineral claimant::;
it is incumbent upon the former to show as a
present fact that the character of the land is such
that mineral can be obtained from it in such
quantity and quality as to make it more valuable
for mining than for agricultural. * * *
Where the same land may he valuable for both
mineral and agricultural purposes, it is a question of fact whether it is mineral land within the
meaning of the federal statute, and the controversy is settled by the land department, by determining whether the land is more valuable for
the one purpose or the other.''
·with the issuance of the Valentine Scrip or senior
patent the jurisdiction of the Land Department ceased
and its every act subsequent thereto with reference to
the property so patented was wholly void.
Section 121, 18 R. C. L., page 1220, is m part as
follows:
''The land department of the government
was established to supervise the various proceedings whereby a conveyance of the title from the
United States to portions of the public domain is
obtained, and to see that the requirements of different acts of Congress are fully complied with.
It must, therefore, consider and pass upon the
qualifications of the applicant, the acts he has
performed to secure the title, the nature of the
land, and whether it is of the class which is ope 1J
to sale. Prior to issuance of the patent the land
department has control over the disposition of
the public lands, and may inquire whether the
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original entry was in conformity with the act
of Congress. * * * But one who has obtained a patent from the government cannot be called to answer in regard to it before tho officers of
the land department. The only way in which
his title can be then impeached is by suit."
rrhe Supreme Court of the United States held. in
Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Campbell, 135 U. S. 286 at
301, 10 Sup. Ct. 765, 34 U. S. L. Ed. 155, as follows :
"\Ve have more than once held that when
the government has issued and delivered it"
patent for lands of the United States, the control of the department over the title to such land
has ceased, and the only way in which the title
can be impeached is by a bill in chancery; and
we do not believe that, as a general rule, the
man who has obtained a patent from the government can be called to answer in regard to that
patent before the officers of the land department
of the government.''
No doctrine of relation can apply as to this area
m conflict from the issuance of the junior patent,
which as to that area was void. The Land Department
cannot divest itself of title upon the issuance of tho
senior patent and thereafter defeat the senior patent
by the issuance of a junior patent and the application
thereto of some doctrine of relation whereby to give
the title of the junior patentee an origin prior to the
senior patent. Before the jurisdiction of the Land Department could have been revived and the junior patent
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issued the United States government must have instituted an action by way of direct attack in a court of equity
as a result whereof the senior patent had been avoided
and the land in dispute had reverted to the public domain, again within the jurisdiction of the Land Department. \V"e are aware of no authority to the contrary.
It has been held by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Steel v. St. Louis Smelting Etc. Co.,
106 U. S. 447, at 450, 1 Sup. Ct. 389, 27 U. S. L. Ed. 226,
as follows:
"That department, (the Land Department)
as we have repeatedly said, was established to
supervise the various proceedings whereby a
conveyance of the title from the United States to
portions of the public domain is obtained, and to
see that the requirements of different acts of
Congress are fully complied with. Necessarily,
therefore, it must consider and pass upon the
qualifications of the applicant, the acts he has
performed to secu·re the title, the nature of the
land, and whether it is of the class which is open
to sale. Its judgment upon these matters is that
of a special tribunal, and is unassailable except
by direct proceedings for its annulment or limitation. Such has been the uniform language of
this court in repeated decisions.
"In .T ohnson v. Towsley, the effect of the
action of that department was the subject of
special consideration. And the court applied the
general doctrine, 'that when the law has confided to a special tribunal the authority to hear
and determine certain matters arising in the
course of its duties, the decision of that tribunal,
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within the scope of its authority, is conclusive upon all others,' and said, speaking by Mr. Justice
Miller, 'that the action of the land office in
issuing a patent for any of the public land, subject to sale by pre-emption or otherwise is conclusive of the legal title, must be admitted under the principle above stated, and in all courts,
and in all forms of judicial proceedings, where
this title must control, either by reason of the
limited powers of the court, or the essential
character of the proceeding, no inquiry can be
permitted into the circumstances under which it
was obtained.' 13 Wall. 72, 83.

.

""

. . . .

""

" "" "" • The validity of a patent of the
government cannot be assailed collaterally bebecause false and perjured testimony may have
been used to secure it, any more than a judgment of a court of justice can be assailed collaterally on like ground.
•
•
""
""
•
*
•

'' * * * So with a patent for land of
the United States, which is the result of the
judgment upon the right of the patentee by that
department of the government, to which thl
alienation of the public lands is confided, the
remedy of the aggrieved party must be sought
by him in a court of equity, if he possess such
an equitable right to the premises as would gwe
him the title if the patent were out of way.
If
he occupy with respect to the land no such position as this, he can only apply to tho officers of
the government to take measures in its name
to vacate the patent or limit its operation. It
cannot be vacated or limited in proceedings
where it comes collaterally in question. It can34

not be vacated or limited by the officers themselves; their power over the land is ended when
the patent is issued and placed on the records of
the department. This can be accomplished only
by regular judicial proceedings, taken in the
name of the government for that special purpose."
(Italics ours).
The attention of the court 1s respectfully directed
to the case of Ferry v. John L. Street, 4 Utah 521. We
think the principles therein so clearly stated are controlling upon the questions here under discussion. We
will not quote from the decision, but we do commend
it to the present consideration of this court.
As said in Carpentier v. Montgomery, 80 U. S. 480,
496, 20 L. Ed. 698:
"The case is somewhat analogous to that
of patents granted upon a pre-emption right for
public land. Whilst the patent in that case confers the legal title, and admits of no averment to
the contrary, the patentee may be subjected in
equity to any just claim of a third party, even
to the extent of holding the title for his sole use.
The grounds of equitable jurisdiction in such
cases are stated in the opinion of this court in
the recent case of Johnson v. Towsley."
And in Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U. S. 72, 83, the court
held:
'' • • • That the action of the land office in issuing a patent for any of the public land,
subject to sale by pre-emption or otherwise, is
conclusive of the legal title, must be admitted un35

cler the principle above stated, and in all courts,
and in all forms of judicial proceedings, where
this title must control, either by reason of the
limited powers of the court, or the essential character of the proceeding, no inquiry can be permitted into the circumstances under which it was
obtained. On the other hand there has always
existed in the courts of equity the power in certain classes of cases to inquire into and correct
mistakes, injustice, and wrong in both judicial
and executive action, however solemn the form
which the result of that action may assume, when
it invades private rights; and by virtue of this
power the final judgments of courts of la\v have
been annulled or modified, and patents and other
important instruments issuing from the crown,
or other executive branch of the government,
have been corrected or declared void, or other
relief granted. No reason is perceived why the
action of the land office should constitute an exception to this principle. * * * And so, if for
any other reason recognized by courts of equity,
as a ground of interference in such cases, the
legal title has passed from the United States to
one party, when, in equity and good conscience,
and by the laws which Congress has made on
the subject, it ought to go to another,' a court of
equity will,' in the language of this court in the
case of Stark v. Starrs, just cited, 'convert him
into a trustee of the true owner, and compel him
to convey the legal title'. In numerous cases this
has been announced to be the settled doctrine of
this court in reference to the action of the Jan;l
officers. * * *
"Not only has it been found necessary in
the interest of justice to hold thi:;; doctrine in regard to thfl decisions of the land officers of thfl
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United States, but it has been found equally
necessary in the States which have had a system of land sales. Numerous cases are found in
the courts of Kentucky and Virginia, where
they have, by proceedings in equity, established the junior patent to be the title
instead of the elder patent, by an inquiry into
the priority of location or some other equitable
matter, or have compelled the holder of the title
under the patent to convey, in whole or in part,
to some persons whose claim rested on matters
wholly anterior to the issuing of the patent. There
is also a similar course of adjudication in the
State of Pennsylvania, and we doubt not cases
may be found in other States. Several of thP
Kentucky cases have come to this court, where
the principle has been uniformly upheld.
•
•
•
"'
"'
"'
*

'' * • * This court "' * * has constantly asserted the right of the proper courts
to inquire, after the title had passed from the
government, and the question became one of private right, whether, according to the established
rules of equity and the acts of Congress concerning the public lands, the party holding that
title should hold absolutely as his own, or as trustee for another. * * * " (Italics ours).
We will now proceed to a discussion of the cases
upon which appellants rely, viz.:
Uinta

Tunnel Mining & Transportation Co. v.
Creede & Cripple ,Creek Mining & Milling
Co., 119 Fed. 164;
Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U. S. 348, 8 Sup. Ct. 1132;
Davis v. Wiebold, 139 U. S. 507, 11 Sup. Ct. 628;
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Butte iCity Smoke-House Lode Cases, 6 Mont. 397,
12 Pac. 858;
Silver Bow M. & M. Co. v. Clarke, 5 Mont. 378, 5
Pac. 570;
Talbott v. King, 6 Mont. 76, 9 Pac. 434.
A cursory reading of the excerpts from these cases
eontained in appellants' brief and a comparison thereof with the citations in resondents' brief would lead the
reader to conclude a continuous irreconcilable conflict
existed in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States upon this question. An examination we
think will find them distinguishable.
Uinta Tunnel Mining & Transportation Company v.
Creede (same case on writ of error in 196 U. S. 337, 23
Sup. Ct. 266, 49 L. Ed. 501), was a case where~ 1 the
plaintiff had located and received patent for two lode
mining claims across the defendant's tunnel site, which
tunnel in its course passed through plaintiff's claims
beneath the surface. The issue was whether or not
the defendant had the right of way along the bore of
its tunnel through the lode claims of the plaintiff,
which issue was to be determined by the priority between the respective claims. It was the contention of
the plaintiff that its claims were located January 2,
1892, and that the patents related back and took effect
as of the dab of sueh locations. 'l'hc tunnel site location had not gone to patent, but is location was madf:
on January 13, 1892, and defendant alleged that no discovery had been made within plaintiff's lode claims
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until after defendant's tunnel site had been located. Tho
trial court refused to permit defendant to prove such
lack of discovery within plaintiff's claims. As already
stated in this brief in our discussion of the Creede case
the court held the certificates of location were not even
evidentiary of the fact of discovery and the other facts
therein stated, that while the patent related back to the
initiation of the right, the date of such initiation must
be proved, that there was no presumption other than
that at the timc;J of entry the location had been perfected,
the court saying (pp. 169-70):

'' '* '* '* The marking of boundaries and
filing of location certificates may precede discovery or discovery may precede them, but no
location is valid until both are complete. The
earlier act then inures to the benefit of the locator as of the date of the later, subject to all
rights which have intervened between them.
(Cases cited). '* '* '* There was therefore
no valid location of the lode claims until the discoveries within them were made, and it is held
by the circuit court of appeals of the Ninth circuit in Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Min. Co.,
61 Fed. 557, 565, 9 C. C. A. 613, 621, that a patent
for a mining claim only relates back to the time
when a valid location was first made".
The court in that case permitted such an inquiry in an
action at law because it was no attack upon the prior
patent ''to assert the rights of the claimant of a tunnel
site located before the entry of the land against a patent of it to a lode claimant, because under the statutes
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and the law such a patent always issues subject to those
rights." (p. 169). r:rhe court further holding at page
168:
"Under the Revised States and the law the
entries and patents of these claims vested the
title to them subject to the rights of the prior
claimant of the tunnel site just as they vested
it subject to the right of an owner of an adjoining lode claim to follow on its dip through a
side line and through the patented territory of
these lode claimants any vein which has its apex
in his claim. ''
And at page 170 that the land department "was notrequired to determine and it did not decide the question
here at issue, and under the statutes and the decisions
of the federal courts the entries and the patents were
made subject to the rights of the claimant of the tunnel
site which had attached before the land department permitted the entries".
The case of Noyes v. Mantle was a bill in equity
to quiet title. The plaintiff was the owner of a lode
within the placer claim patented to the defendant. The
lode had been located before the location of the placer.
r:rhe court called attention to the law that placer locations and patents did not carry title to lodes therein
"known to exist" unless such there be not then located
to appropriate which the placer application and patent
had contained a proper reference whereby to include
them, and that a lode claim perfected prior to the location of the placer is by law excepted from the placer
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patent.

There was and could be no conflict between

the patents and there waR by that decision not an avoiding of one but im<tead the definition of each.
Davis v. \Viebold, Butte City Smoke-House Lode
Cases, Silver Bow M. & M. Co. v. Clarke, and Talbott ''· King all involved the question of priority of
townsite patents over the locations of mining claims
within such townsites.

In Davis v. Wiebold townsite

patents were held under the Act of Congress to convey
title to no mines of gold, etc., known to exist on the
issuance of the townsite patents. In that case patent
had issued to the townsite before the mining claim had
been located upon a vein therein.

In the light of pres-

ent learning upon the subject it is apparent the Land
Department had no jurisdiction whatever to issue the
mineral patent, the government already by its townsite
patent having divested itself of the entire title to thP
land therein included..

rnw court so held, saying that

the townsite patent would carry title to all mines within the land pateuted not then known to exist.

Davis v.

Wiebold was an appeal from the Supreme Court of thu
Territory of Montana and the Supreme Court of the
United States in its decision in that case referred to
the three remaining cases cited by

appeJlants here,

namely, Butte City Smoke-House Lode Cases, Silver
Bow M. & M. Co. v. Clarke and Talbott v. King, as cases
"in which very able and learned opinions were given
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by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana", to
which cases we will now refer.
In each the Smoke-House Cases, Silver Bow M. &
M. Co. v. Clarke and Talbott v. King the Supreme Court
of the Territory of Montana was called upon to define
a townsite patent with reference to the location or patent of a mining claim within the townsite, the location
whereof had been made prior to the entry of the townsite. Each of these suits was at law, apparently suits
in ejectment, and in each of them the court held that
there was no conflict between the mineral and townsite
patents; each was valid and neither was restricted by
the other because, as stated in Davis v. Wiebold, there
was by Act of Congress expressly excepted from the
townsite patent all mines and mining claims within the
townsite then known to exist. As said in the SmokeHouse cases:
"It was not possible for either to have acquired any right or title to the property of the
other by virtue of his patent. The patents do
not cover or touch the same property. * * *
''The Smoke-House location, being a valid
mining claim at the time, was expressly excepted
from the operation of the townsite patent, and it
was not possible by such a patent to have obtained any interest therein or title thereto. There
is no conflict between a town-site patent and a
mining claim patent, and can be none. They
evidence separate and distinct grants and cannot conflict with one another. The one conveys
a mining claim, an independent grant, and the
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other conveys ground for a town-site, from which,
by the law, all valid mining claims and possessions are excluded • • • The two titles take
hold of and affect property that is entirely separate and distinct.
''The officers of the land department had no
authority to convey a mining claim by the issuance of a to·wnsite patent, and no authority to
convey a town-site by the issuance of a miningclaim patBnt. At the time of issuing the townsite patent, they had no authority to declare that
the Smoke-House location was not a valid mining
claim and possession; and having no such authority, they excluded from: the operation of the townsite patent all mines, mining calims, and possessions, as the law required.

•
''And now, why should the owners of the
Smoke-House location have filed an adverse
claim to the application for the town-site patent?
They knew that the town-site patent, when issued,
would exclude from its operation all valid mines,
mining claims and possessions, and therefore
they had no adverse claim. They could not object to the issuance of the townsite patent, for
it could not interfere with or in any manner affect the Smoke-House location. Suppose they
had filed an adverse claim, they would have been
informed that they were meddling with what did
not concern them. They would have been told
that the townsite patent, when issued, could not
touch the Smoke-House location.
And after quoting at length from the opinion of Mr.
Justice Field in the case of Deffeback v. Hawke, 115
U. S. 392, the court continued:
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"That is equivalent to saying, what we have
already said in this decision, that the town-site
patent took hold of the non-mineral lands included within its limits, but did not touch or in any
manner affect the mining claims therein;. and
hence that the patent to the Butte town-site did
not affect the Smoke-House location; and, further, that there is not and cannot be any conflict between a town-site and a mining claim
patent."
All of which was both able and learned.
Of course the judgment in each of the above cases
was correct, but their relevancy to the issue now before this court is not apparent to respondents. There
was no reservation in the patent to the Valentine Scrip
of then known mines or mining claims, nor was such
a reservation authorized by law. It is true only nonmineral, unoccupied and unappropriated land could be
purchased with Valentine Scrip and accordingly the
Land Department was called upon, as was its duty, to
determine the character of the land before the allowance of the entry or issuance of patent therefor. The
Land Department made its investigation and determined
that the land was non-mineral, unoccupied and unappropriated and issued its patent in the performance of
the duty Congress had imposed upon it, all within its
jurisdiction so defined. There could be no greater conflict than that between the Valentine Scrip and the area
of the McGuire & Company's placer within the scrip
entry. The law did not except one from the other. One
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completely excluded the other. When the Land Department issued its patent to the Valentine Scrip its
jurisdiction ceased with reference to that area and any
other attempt on its part to deal with the title to the
land so patented was under all the authorities wholly
beyond its jurisdiction and wholly void. The law provided the method for review and courts of equity
possessed the necessary powers on a proper application
to correct imposition, fraud and mistake, but counsel
have yet to refer us to an authority that will sanction
in an action of ejectment such an inquiry. Appellants'
attack upon respondents' patent is a collateral attack,
to which respondents' patent, being the senior patent,
by all authority is immune.
Counsel cite the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the Territory of Montana no doubt because the
· definitions therein contained of a mining claim are
favorable to their contention, a mining claim being
therein defined as a grant in praesenti, a grant or sale,
"a withdrawal thereby of so much of the public land.
from sale or pre-emption", "a grant with the right
to purchase the absolute title", "it is already sold and
becomes private property which may be disposed of at
the will of the owner", and that a mining patent relates back to the date of locati.on, the presumption for
bidding proof of discovery, marking on the ground and
other essentials as to the validity of such location. In
all of those respeciR, the opinions were neither verr
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able nor learned, for the Supreme Court of the United
States has refused to adopt such definitions of a mining
location or such theory of relation of a mining patent
to the date of location. Of course a mining claim is
"property in the fullest sense of the word"-it may be
sold, transferred and inherited-but there is no sal.!
of the land located until the purchase price has bcun
paid and accepted, receiver's receipt issued and the
claim entered, much less is there a sale by the me I e
filing with i;he district recorder of a notice of location
or the posting thrreof on the claim. By the mere location of a mining claim, even though it be a valid, perfected location, there is no sale or grant 1n praesenti,
nor is the land so located withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Land Departmerrt---'quite the contrary, the
Land Department has yet to dispose of that land, to see
that all the conditions precedent to patent and the vesting of title in the locator have been performed, of
which there is none more import·ant than the determination of the mineral or non-mineral character of the land
and the marking of the claim on the ground. That a
patent does not relate back to the date of the notice
of location or to the date of the posting thereof, unless
upon that date there was a valid discovery and a marking of the claim on the ground, as to which neither the
patent nor notice of location raises any presumption
prior to entry, has been the unvarying decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States as indicated by
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Creede & Cripple Creek Mining Co. v. Uinta Tunnel
Mining Co., in 196 U. S. 337.
In all of this counsel overlook the fact that the
Land Department in the course of its duty and within
its jurisdiction determined the land in question was not
mineral, not occupied and not appropriated, and, acting within that jurisdiction, conveyed the title to
another, completely divesting itself of all jurisdiction
with reference thereto. In the light of the decisions
from which we have quoted, appellants could not in this
suit at law successfully rely on their patent, were it
valid, as raising any presumption whatever as to the
validity of their placer location upon the occasion of
the issuance of the Valentine Scrip patent or the entry
of the land so patented. But the placer patent, having
been issued at a time when the Land :Qepartment was
without jurisdiction over the property included within
the Valentine Scrip, was ·a nullity as to such area in
conflict and could neither relate back to nor revive
anything.
Nor is there anything in the testimony offered in
this case to indicate that the Land Department erred
in its determination that the Valentine was nonmineral in character, unoccupied and unappropriated.
Land is not mineral unless it can be said that "mineral
can be obtained from it in such quantity and quality as
to make it more valuable for mining than for agriculture'' or uses other than mining. 18 R. C. L. § 122, p.
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The testimony below was insufficient to establish

1222.

a valid discovery.

Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U. S. 313, 25

Sup. Ct. 468, 49 L. Ed. 770, and Steele v. 'f1anana .Mines
1~.

Co., 148 ]'eel. 678.

~mit

in

Iu tho latter case, which was a

equity, the United States

C5ircuit Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit hold:
''The evidence of tho discovery of mineral
on the placer claim is as follows: 'rho appellant
testified that for about ten days prior to locating
the claim he prospected the ground, and in so doing panned frequently, with the result that in
most instances he secured colors of gold and in
some instances fairly good prospects of golrl.
Another witness, one vVoocl ward, who was hi red
to further prospcet on tho elaim, testified that
the result of his panning 'showed colors of gol(l
in each instance and many of such pans showed
what miners and prospectors are in tho habit of
calling 'good prospects' of gold.' Tho testimony
of another witness was thni he panned seYeral
pans of gravel and dirt on said claim and found
colors of gold in each instance, and that, while
there he saw se,·eral pans washed out by Mr.
'Woodward with some\vhat better results, all of
said pans contained colors readily and easily seen
and in some instances quite a number of them.
The sum and substance of this evidence is, not
that gold had been discovered on the claim in
such quantities as to justify a person of ordinary
prudence in further expending labor and means
with a reasonable prospect of snrrt~ss, hut that
colors of gold han been found which were fairly
good prospects of gold. Doubtless, colors of
gold may he found by panning in the dry bed of
any creek in Alaska, anc1 miners, upon such en48

couragement, may be willing to further explore
in the hope of finding gold in paying quantities.
But such prospects are not sufficient to show that
the land is so valuable for mineral as to take it
out of the category of agricultural lands and to
establish its character as mineral land when it
comes to a contest between a mineral claimant
and another claiming the land under other laws
of the United States.
Reduced to narrative form the testimony admitted
upon the trial to prove a valid perfected location of
the McGuire & Company's placer claim was merely
the following:
Michael Gibbons, a witness produced by the
plaintiff, testified as follows: (Direct examination, Tr. 64-5-6). The character of the surface
ground of the McGuire & Company placer at the
time it was located was gravel, which at that
time was being panned or sluiced for minerals and
minerals were recovered. :All the way from
where the Bingham & Garfield Depot is down
through that gulch where this controversy is
about Maxwell's property, and then right to the
north of Stevie Hays' residence, which was north
of the Maxwell ground, they was working there
and they used to pan gold there. Mr. McGuire
used to. I have seen him gold pan right from the
town on that rim rock going down into the gulch
on the McGuire placer, but the McGuire placer
at the time I am speaking of was not located. The
McGuire placer was panned down on the rim
rock as far as they could go down.
(Cross Examination, Tr. 70). The placer
operations upon the McGuire claim ceased in the
early 80s. Mr. McAvinney bought Mr. McGuire's
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interest and operate(l a few years, but with his
death the operation of the placer ceased and it
has not been operated since.
1'here was no testimony whatever aR to the moHumenting or marking of the elaim on the ground, 110 eompliance is shown with the rull'S and regulations of the
mining district, nor \Yere those rules or regulations
offered in evidence.

·we submit the tcstimoJJy below doe:-; JJot risn to tll'.'
dignity of the rule staie(l in Nteele v. Tauana Mines R.
Co., supra.

Not that it was 011r posit ion lwlow that

appellants should have hem1

pl~rmittl'd

cove17, for we objected to tlH'

to pnwr a dis-

~ulmission

of any testi-

mony relative therMo and such proof \\'as introducril
hy appellants over our ohjPction an<l excnption, yl't on
appellants' theory, which seems to us to confuRo nll di;,;tinctions between law and equitable aetions awl the relief and defenses applicable thereto re;,;peetivcly, not
only dol'H the area here in controversy appear non-mineral but ncitl1cr valid (liscovery upon the placer nor tlw
mommH~nt ing

tlwreof has he<'n

pron~d

and hence neither

can be presumed 11pon the oeeaRion of tlw

'r

alentine

Scrip entry.
But the dodrino emmcinter1 h.\' the d1•cisions of the
Supreme Conrt of tlw 'I\·nitory of l\foutana cited by
counsel and hcreinbefon~ di;oenssed \V('l'e repudiated h'
the Supreme Court of the Rtat1' of Montana in the case
of lior;,;ky v. :Moran, 21 Mont. :345, 53 Pac. 1064.
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That

suit was not in ejectment but was a suit in equity to
quiet title to the land within a placer claim that had
been located prior to the ('ntry of a townsite. ..:\Jthough
the placer elaimant had negleetd doing any work upon
his claim for nearly hve11ty years after the entry of

the~

townsite, still the plaeer claim had never been relocated
or forfeited and tlw placer claimant procee(lcd to rely
upon these decisions of the Snpreme Court of the rrcrritory of Montana cited by counsel.

'The court with

reference thereto said (pp. 1065-G6-70):
"He eites Milling Co. v. Clarke, 5 Mont.
:378, 5 Pac. 570; rralhott V. King, G Mont. 7G, 9
Pac. 4:34; King Y. rnwmas, 6 Mont. 490, 12 Pae.
8G5; Butte City Smoke-House Lode Cases, I)
Mont. 3£)7, 12 Pac. 858; * * *

"It is from obscure language used in some
of these decisions, mainly the phrase 'previously
conveyed,' that confusion arises as to what constitutes such an absence of authority as will authorize a judgment of nullity on collateral
attack. The Montana decisions relied upon by defendant indicate this confusion. * * *
'' * * '" What is the charaeter of th•]
title obtaiued hy defendant to the lan<l in controven;y from l1is mining location! \Vas tlw land
embraced therein previously dispo;,cd of b:' the
govcrnmrnt. as far aR tlw tmnl-Ritc p;dent is concerned'? T am well aware that in SC\'ernJ cases,
11otahly Relic v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 2A8, and
F'orlws v. Gracey, ~)4 U. S. 762, the title conferred
by a mining loeatio11 is spoken of in tPrms of such
high respl~et aR almost to justify tlw inferonct~
51

that it is on a par with a title by patent, or one
based on a certificate of final proof and purchase; but surely the court, using this language
in cases where vital existing rights or claims of
rights were before it, did not intend such inference
to be drawn and applied in aU cases. Before the
holder of such a claim has made proof of his compliance with the statutory requirements regulating the obtainment of a patent to his location,
and paid the purchase price therefor, he has only
an inchoate right to title, at best. He is under
no obligations to make final proof, and pay the
purchase price, so as to entitle him to patent.
Mining Co. v. Bugbey, 96 U. S., on page 167. It
is well to notice here that there is a clear distinction between the holders of a valid claim
whose rights are possessory only, and one who,
having fulfilled all the conditions required by law,
has received or is entitled to a certificate of
purchase. See Sherman v. Buick, 93 U. S. 209;
Simmons v. Wagner, 101 U. S. 260; Land Co. v.
Rawson, 62 Fed. 427.
"There is no grant in praesenti, under the
mineral laws, to the mere locator of a mining
claim.''
'rhe court relied lar~ely upon U. S. v. Schurz, 102 U. S.
378, which was a contest between a homesteader and
certain townsite claimants within the Town of Grantsville, in Tooele County of this State, to which decision
reference is made for the distinction between void and
voidable patents and a definition of the jurisdiction of
the Land Department and the courts with reference
ihereto.
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The Horsky suit was one in equity and the court
held the defense of laches a good defense. The placer
claimant having waitedt twenty years to assert his claim,
was not entitled to equitable relief, and the court quoted
with approval from the opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer
in Naddo v. Bardon, 51 Fed. 495, 2 C. 'C. A. 337, as follows:
''No doctrine is so wholesome, when wisely
administered, as that of laches. It prevents the
resurrection of stale titles, and forbids the spying out from the records of ancient and abandoned rights. It requires of every owner that
he take care of his property, and of every claimant that he make known his claims. It gives to
the actual and long possessor security, and induces and justifies him in all efforts to improve
and make valuable the property he holds. It is
a doctrine received with favor, because its proper
application works out justice and equity, and
often bars the holder of a mere technical right,
which he has abandoned for years, from enforcing it when its enforcement will work large injury to many.''
How clearly applicable that quotation is to the facts
of our case! Respondents, it seems to us, should not
be denied that defense if appellants are in this action
to be permitted to set aside the senior patent that this
junior patent may have priority.
Horsky v. Moran went to the Supreme Court of
the United States, but the writ of error was dismissed
because the decision below had been on the ground of
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laches, wl1ich did not present a Federal question.

The

opinion by Mr.•Justice Brewer appears in 178 U. S.
205, 20 Sup. Ct. 856, 44 L. Eel. 1038.

It is worthy of

note that the court adopted the definition of a mining
location as stated by the Supreme court of Montana,
saymg:

" ·~ * * the apparent legal title passed
to the probate ;judg·e, and thereafter to the plaintiff, and it was only an equitable and inchoate
right which the defendant was trying to assert.''

II.
Point.
Appellants' action is barred by the provisions of Sections 6449 and 6450 of the Compiled Laws of Utah. 1917.

Prior to tho year 1888 the Lam; of Utah did notrequire the payment of taxes as a eowlitio11

p1·ecc~dent

to

the acquisition of title by adverse posse>ssion, the seven
year period of adverse possession being sufficient in itself.
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1876, S<"rtion 10D7 to 1104,
inclusive;
Rio Grande Westeru Railway Co. v. Salt Lake InY.
Co., :15 Utah 528, 101 Pac. 586, at 590;
Rydalch v. Anderson,

:n

Utah

~)9,

107 Pac. 25.

\Ve submit the following testimony is snfneient to justify finding No. II of the court below of title in respond-
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ents and fimling No. V as to the adverse character of
the posses:-;ion of S. S. Maxwell, title thereby having
been acquired by :Maxwell prior to the taking effect of
Sections 31iW to 31:3~!, inelusive, Volume 2, Compile(]
Laws of Utah, 1888.
Mr .•Jerome Bouregard, a witness produced
on bdwlf of re:-;pomlents testified on direct examination ('l'r. 2:3), that he had purchaseu Lot 6,
clircetly auoss the street from Lot 10 or the Max--well lot, in 1880, and was (~ngaged in business
on that location continuously from 1880 until the
fall of 1D2::l; that he knew S. S. Maxwell and that
in the late 70s or early 80s Maxwell built a cabin
on Lot 10, almost directly across the street from
Mr. Bouregard 's place of business on Lot 6, and
1lax\Ydl lived in that cabin continuously up until a short time before he died. ('rr. 25) Maxwell
while he lived on Lot 10 occnpiecl it as the owner
and the lot \VaR called the Maxwell lot.
Mr. Bouregard also testified on direct examination ('l'r. 22) that he and his family had
lived on Lot J1 immediately adjoining the Maxwell lot on tho south for twenty-five ~Tears; that
while Maxwell was living ou Lot 10 Mr. Bouregard perhaps (lid have a little boundary dispute
with Mr. Maxwell, who wanted to put a little
garden along tho boundary between the two promises, lmt that was alL (Tr. 25-6).
Mr. J. Fewson Smith, a witness produced on
behalf of respondents, testified on direct examination (Tr. 27-8-~l) that he had made the snrvey shown on the (lra wi ug (Defendants' Exhibit
78); that S. S. Maxwell was the man who daimed
the lot thereon colored yellow, which was the
same as Lot 10, Block 4, Plat "A", Wilkes Official
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Survey of Bingham Townsite; that he had seen
Mr. Maxwell and conversed with him; that his
survey was made in the fall of 1898; that the
double or hatched line around the left on the
southeast corner of the lot was the outline of a
rock wall which he located on the date of the survey; that Maxwell was living on that lot at the
date of the survey.
Mr. Smith testified on cross-examination (Tr.
32) that Mr. Maxwell's statement to him was that
he, Maxwell, claimed up to a certain point, and
referring to the house of Mr. Bouregard, that he
had fifty feet frontage; that Mr. Maxwell had
asked nothing of Mr. Smith, but that the latter
had asked Mr. Maxwell for his boundaries; that
the witness wanted Mr. Maxwell to show the
boundaries to him; that Mr. Bouregard stayed
aloof for some reason, they did not get together,
but the witness took Mr. Maxwell's statement.
Dr. F. E. Straup, a witness produced on behalf of respondents, testified on direct examination (Tr. 32-3-4) that in 1896 he was living in the
house shown as Lot 12 on Plaintiffs' Exhibit B
immediately south of the Maxwell lot and just behind Mr. Bouregard 's house on Lot 11; that he
met Mr. Maxwell right after moving into that
house and bought the Maxwell lot from Mr. Maxwell in 1899; that he bought it because there was
no yard about the house, Lot 12, where he was
living, the house occupying the entire lot; that
Mr. Maxwell and he discussed the ownership of
the ground directly back of the Maxwell house
and directly north of Lot 12; that the witness had
been using that ground out of the necessity of his
situation, but Mr. Maxwell protested his using
it because Mr. Maxwell owned it and Dr. Straup
had no right there; that the Doctor, therefore,
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bought the Maxwell lot with the expectation of
building on it; that when he bought the Maxwell
lot it seemed to him there was a little wall or the
representation of a wall between Maxwell's house
and the store building next to it.
On cross-examination
testified as follows:

(Tr. 38) Dr. Straup

'' Q. And when you took the deed from Maxwell,·

did you cause the title to be examined 7

•
''A. The house and the ground-no, I talked
with Mr. Maxwell, and I had known him for
a long time, and I talked with old timers in
the camp there, and in those days we
described and took our ground according to
the occupancy and the usage claimed, and
so forth.
'' Q. You did not go through the formality

or
take the trouble of examining the record to
see who really did own the record title¥

"A. No. I thought Mr. Maxwell had pretty
good title to the ground. I knew that he had
lived there, and I knew that he was on the
ground. I know that he used the ground,
and I thought he was entitled to the ground
that he deeded to me, or else I would not
have purchased it."
Attention is called at this time to the deed from
Mr. Maxwell to Dr. Straup (Defendants' Exhibit 1),
which is a bargain and sale deed with covenants by Mr.
Maxwell against encumbrances.
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Dr. Albert L. Castleman, a witness produced
behalf of respondents, testified on cross-examination (Tr. 48) that in purchasing the property from Charles McCann he had assumed the
title was good without investigation because ho
knew tho history of tho previous occupants for
quite a number of years, that is, from 1891 at
which time he first went to Bingham, remaining
thoro at that time throe and a half years, which
was when Mr. Maxwell ~was living on the ground;
that when the witneRs came hack to Bingham in
1904 Mr. McCann was living there and Mr. McCann showed him the deed from Dr. Straup or
Maxwell.
011

Michael Gibbons, a witness produced on behalf of appellants, testified on direct examination
(Tr. 58) that he had moved to Bingham in April
of 1874 and resided in or spent most of his time
there until 1910, barring a few years when he
"worked in Idaho (Tr. 76-7); that he knew S. S.
Maxvvell in Bingham and Mr. Maxwell spoke to
him twice about wanting to got a title fixed up,
to got a deocl for it, which was during the time
Maxwell was living on this property, that Mr.
Maxwell had gotten some money from Col. Wall,
sold the J. Gould mine and that was about the
elate tho witness could recall, and Mr. Maxwell
spoke to him about getting the deed. He sai<l
he had some money then and he wanted to fix up
the title, but there was nothing done about it
and he spoke to the witness again about it and
said something about seeing Stove, whether
Steve Hays or who it was that ho mentioned, but
that is the last that was ever said about it, never
got it fixed up.

"Q. Did Mr. Hays over speak to you about any
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claims he may have in the McGuire & Company Placer 1

•
MR. PARSONS: I object to that as mcompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

*
THE GOUR''l': Is it your interpretation of
this evidence that the talk-that this man
Maxwell wanted to get the title fixed up,
that that ~was a recognition 1
MR. WALLACE: I think the inference
most clearly from that is that that certainly
was not adverse.
(Argument and discussion).
THE COURT: I don't see how that can
be possible. You might buy a tax title on
Mr. McBroom's lan<l, and he might talk with
you about getting it fixed up. That does
not change the character of his occupation
of the land in any way, as I take it. Tt
must be something more than that".
The witness then testified (Tr. 79) that Mr.
Stephen Hays had spoken to him a couple of
times shortly after Mr. Hays had purchased the
Valentine Scrip, about combining the two titles,
1\Ir. Gibbons to give him half the placer and he to
give l\Ir. Gibbons half the Valentine Scrip; that
Mr. Gibbons at that time had a power of attorney
from his sister, the appellant Rose Gibbons, but
he didn't feel he could do anything ~with refereHce to Mr. Hays' suggestion lest he might
jeopardize his sister's interest.
On recross-examination Mr. Gibbons could
not fix the time of the above conversation with
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Mr. Maxwell (Tr. 80) and he testified that Mr.
Maxwell had occupied Lot 10 as nearly as he
could recollect from 1878, 1879 or 1880; that the
only way he could recollect about it was Mr. McGuire's telling him that he, Mr. McGuire, had
given Mr. Maxwell permission to go on there;
that the witness was there all those years and
saw Mr. Maxwell living there during all of that
time after he, Mr. Maxwell, had built his house;
that (Tr. 82) he didn't know what Mr. Maxwell
claimed; that Mr. Maxwell never claimed to him
that he was a claimer of the title, that Maxwell
was not a tenant, that Mr. M·cGuire was the one
that let him go on there and the witness never
interfered with him (Tr. 83), never asserted as
against him any title that the witness or his
associates might have in the placer claim, never
did anything to him.
The mere fact that the adverse claimant offers to
purchase the owner's title in order to quiet the claimant's title does not amount to a recognition of the
owner's title nor will such offer stop the running of
the statute. The trial court was correct in its comment
above upon the nature of the testimony appellants propose to introduce. As was said in Oldig v. Fisk, 53 Neb.
159, 73 N. W. 661, at 662:
''A party in possession of land as owner
certainly has a right to protect that possession by
the purchase of any outstanding claim or lien
against the property. There is not thereby any
break in the possession, nor does the adverse
occupant rely upon his purchased title in preference to the one which he previously possessed.
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He joins the two together, and possesses whatever title both may give him".
See also:
Weise v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 77 Neb. 40, 108 N.
W. 175, (Aff. 208 U. S. 234, 28 Sup. Ct. 294,
52 L. Ed. 466) ;
Montgomery, Etc. Lumber C!o. v. Quimby, 164 CaL
250, 128 Pac. 402.
McAllister v. Hartzell, 60 Oh. St. 69, 53 N. E. 715, at
718, where it is said:

"It is conceded by the authorities that one
in possession under a claim of title may offer to
purchase without prejudice to that title. In this
state color of title is not necessary to adverse
possession . It is said that the offer to buy is an
acknowledgment that the other has the legal title,
and that such acknowledgment is fatal to the
claim of adverse possession. But is iU Can a
man not desire to buy his peace as reasonably if
he knows he has no title as if he has title, or believes he has 7 Since it is not necessary that the
holding be under claim of title, how can it be of
consequence that there is no denial, but in fact
is an admission, of the opposing title~ Nor is it
necessary that a party should proclaim his purpose in making an offer to buy. But, even
though an offer to buy is an acknowledgment
(for the second request embraces that), how
does that destroy the adverse character of the
possession? Whatever he acknowledges, whatever he says by way of acknowledgment, he
still holds on to the possession; and it is the
possession which, if unlawful, wrongs the other,
and not the motive nor the belief of the possessor.
It cannot help the case any that the intruder ad61

mits the illegal character of his intrusion. By
such a simple acknowledgment he neither says
nor intimates that he will give up possession, nor
that he will bold subject to the other, nor in
recognition of his title. '_llhe opposite view results
in magnifying the state of mind of the party, and
dwarfing his acts. Its adoption \\rouhl, as we
think, work an unwarranted interference wit11
the beneficent operation of a statute intended to
secure respoHc to titles alHl peace io neighborhooiis".
The testimony will of course he constn1ecl most favorably to the finrlings.
HoweYer the proof in this case shows without contra(liction that the clefen<lants and their pre(lcccssors in
interest have been in the continuous occupation and
posession of the premises for the possession of which
this suit has lH'Cn brought, aml the whole thereof, always improving the same and holding them under claim
of title in fee simple, exclusive of all other rig·ht, adversely to the pretended title of the plaintiffs for ::learly fifty years last past before the commencc,ment of this

t-mit, a]](l the defendantR and

their

pn~<leenssors

~'

,d

1
a sse sed upon the premise,; and the improvPmCJl ts thereon aeeonling to law, at ](:ast from and including the
~·ear 18Df:i to aucl including the year l!J24, ~with the single
grantors have paid all taxes that have been levied

:\11

exception of those for the year 190:.?. 'J1lw proof as to
the payment of taxes upon (1) the premises for the
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possession of which this action is brought, and ( 2) MeGuire & Company's placer claim, is as follows:
Lot 10, Block 4,
Plat "A", Bingham
Defendant's Exhibit
Number
Year
Amount

44
43
4-2
41
40
:39
:38
:H
:H;

:35
:343:3
32
31
30
29

2S
27
26
')~

~D

24
23
')'J
_._.

21
79
20
19
18
17

18D5
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1!)20

1!)21
1922
1923
1924-

$1.00
1.17
1.98
1.72
1.78
2.68
1.01
3.04
3.15
7.70
21.50
28.60
;):3.60
33.34
34.83
33.35
38.87
41.97
51.84
63.02
74.01
71.16
65.98
87.15
113.m)
119.72
] 18.32
110.00
101.38

ToTAL .... $1266.96
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McGuire & Company
Placer Claim
Amount
Year

1900
1901
1902
190:3
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
rr011AL ..

$ .64
.60
.57
.59
.59
.66
.69
.78
1.44.81
.81
.78
.83
.90
.81
.89
.72
.35
.78
1.09
1.27
1.15
1.17
1.16
$20.08

Proof of the payment of the taxes on Lot 10 was
by introduction of the duplicate tax receipts issued from
the office of the Treasurer of Salt Lake County, being
the Defendants' Exhibits 17 to 44, both inclusive, and
the certified copy of the redemption certificate covering taxes for the year 1920, being Defendants' Exhibit
79. These tax receipts show upon their face for each
of the years 1895 to 1924, both inclusive, the year 1902
alone excepted, the name of the owner against whom
the assessment was made, the description of the property assessed, the valuation of the real estate and improvements, the amount of the tax, the book, page and
line where the assessment may be found, with a recitation of the payment thereof and the date of such payment. Appellants only objection to this proof is that
it does not identify the one making the payment. Appellants offered no testimony to the effect that the taxes
for any year were paid by one other than him to whom
the property had been assessed. They recognized no
burden of proof whatever upon their part resulting
from the case made by respondents.
Of course there is no record in this state from
which one may ascertain by whom taxes have been paid
and the proof of that fact is impossible in case of
the death or absence of persons who have appeared in
the chain of title, unless there be indulged a presumption in the absence of anything appearing to the contrary that taxes have been paid by the owner to whom
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they were assessed, it being unreasonable to suppose
the taxes were paid by anyone else. The case made by
respondents should have been sufficient to have shifted
to appellants the hurdtm of proving the payment hy
another of the taxes assessed against respondents anu
their predecessors in title.
Houghton v. Barton, 4-!)
Utah 611, 165 Pac. 4-71, at 4-75. So far as these parties
were available respondents proved the payment of taxes
by them. Dr. Straup testified he had paid the taxes
that were assessed upon Lot 10 and the improvements
while he was the owner thereof, that is, between May 26,
1899, and May 8, 1901, (Tr. :14-, :)7, 39, 4-0, 4-1). Dr.
Castleman testified he had paid the taxes that were
assessed upon this property while he was the owner
thereof, that is, between October 5, Hl04-, and March
30, 1907, ('rr. 4-3, 4-9, 50).

Dr. C. N. Ray testified he

had paid the taxes that were assessed upon the property \vhile he was the owner thereof, that is, between
March 30, 1907, and June 30, 1913, (Tr.

52,

53, 54).

Michael Gibbons testified (Tr. 85, 86) that he and his
associates, whom he represented, paid taxes on the
placer claim valued as a placer claim at the rate of $2.50
or $5.00 per acre, as the case might be, as provided by

•

statute and that such were the only taxes Michael Gibbons and

his associates interested in

the placer

ever had paid on that claim. Appelants put in evidence
(Tr. 96 to 100) the taxes paid by them and their

associates on the McGuire & Company placer for the
years 1900 to 1924, both inclusive.
However, counsel admit the testimon,v oven upon
their theory shows a payment of taxes upon Lot 10 as
such for each of the years 1904 to 1912, both inclusive,
by Dr. Castleman and Dr. C. N. Ray, but this counsel
seck to avoid by arguing that the assessments upon Lot
10 and those upon the placer claim were donhlc assessments and, because the payments of the taxes levied UlJon Lot 10 wore not made for seven consecutive years
at a time before the taxes on the placer claim wore paid,
the respondents must fail in their effort to cstahl ish
title by adverse possession.

It must be clear from tho record in this case that
the only value Lot 10 possesses, or over has possessed,
since the occupancy and improvement thereof by S. S.
Maxwell in 1878, is that for residence, a town lot used
for nearly fifty years last past for residence and the
semi-public usc as tho office of physicians and surgeons
and as the sib of hospitals for the care and treatment
of the sick and injured in the town of Bingham Can:-on and vicinity. Obviously such value is and always
has been separate, apart and distinct from any value
that could appertain to the mining claim and of course
it has over at least the years 1895 to 10:24, both inclusive, boon separately assessed accordingly. A comparison over tho period 1000 to 1924, inclusive, of the
total assessed valuations upon this town lot of 50 x 100

feet with its improvements, in round numbers $42,495.00
(taxes paid $1150.00) with the total assessed valuation
upon the entire McGuire & Oompany placer of l 1.77
acres, in round numberR $1015.00 (taxes paid $20.00)
must forcibly impress one with the existence of this
separate and distinct value. As already noted Mr. Gibbons testified that the placer claimant had paid taxes
only upon the placer claim at the statutory valuation of
$2.50 or $5.00 per acre, as the case might be.
Accordingly appellants find themselves squarely
within the rule announced hy this court in the cases of
Utah Copper Company v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142
Pac. 1119, and Utah Copper Company v. Eckman, 47
Utah 165, 152 Pac, 178.
Mr. George Y. Wallace, of appellants' counsel, is
as we all know the author of "Wallace's Utah IndexDigest", and we find in that work on the second page
under the title of "Adverse Possession", sub-title
"Mining Ground", the following:
''Inasmuch as mining claims and surface
rights can be separately assessed for taxation,
adverse possession can be acquired of surface
rights, although owHer of claim paid all taxes
assessed against claim".
citing the Chandler and Eckman cases. That is what
we have thought this court decided in those cases and
we are content with counsel's definition. We also presume that if one claims the estate in the surface as well
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as the estate beneath and the latter be denied him, his
claim of the surface continues unimpaired.
The rule announced by this court in the Chandler
and Eckman cases has become a rule of property in
this jurisdiction, upon which respondents had a right
to rely in their several purchases of Ijot 10 and in the
erection thereupon by the respondent Utah Copper
Company of its hospital at so substantial a cost. Utah
Copper Company in the Chandler and Eckman cases
urged upon this court contentions somewhat similar
to those now made by appellants and therein Utah Copper Company failed in resisting a claim
possession by another.

of

adverse

This court in those cases

announced the rule in obedience to and reliance upon
which Utah Copper Company purchased Lot 10 in the
fall of 1924 and made its very substantial expenditure
thereupon. The rule so announced in the Chandler and
Eckman cases should not now be varied or reversed
again to the defeat of Utah Copper Company and to
confiscation of its investment. The Chandler and Eckman cases are so clearly applicable to the issues now
before this court that we feel we should not by further
reply to counsel's effort to distinguish them, add to the
great length of this brief.

III.
Point.
The appellants are estopped to deny respondents' title.

The proof in this case shows we think without
contradiction:

That Lot 10 lies within the boundaries of the Valentine Scrip as described in the patent therefor, which
patent issued July 10, 1876, and was recorded July 25,
1876, nearly four years before the recording in the
O'ounty Recorder's office of the notice of location of the
McGuire & Company's placer claim, and twenty-one
years before the recording of the placer patent. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, Abstract of Title entries 1, 4 and 28).
That S. S. Maxwell entered into possesion of the
premises herein involved in 1878, 1879 or 1880, to which
John McGuire, one of the o\vners of the McGuire & Company's placer claim consented.
(Tr. 81). Maxwell
immediately built a cabin upon the premises and lived
there continuously thereafter, making the premises his
home until he sold them to nr. F. E. Straup on May
26, 1899. At some time during his occupancy S. S. Maxwell partially inclosed Lot 10 with a rock wall. Maxwell's possession of these premises was at all times under claim of title in fee simple, exclusive of all other
right and adversely to the pretended title of appellants
and their predecessors and grantors. The testimony
defining Maxwell's possession has been discussed in
Part II of this brief.
Maxwell conveyed Lot 10 to Dr. F. E. Straup by
bargain and sale deed on May 26,1 1899, Maxwell thereby
covenanting against encumbrances as follows:
''
* * * the said party of the first part,
for himself and his heirs, executors and admin-
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istrators, does lwrehy covenant and agree, to and
with the said party of the second part, his heirs
and assigns, that he has not made, done, committed, executed or suffered any act or acts, thing
or things whatsoever whereby, or hy means
whereof, the said premises, or any part or parcel
thereof, no\V are, or at any time hereinafter shall,
or may be impeached, charged, or incumbered, in
any manner or way whatsoever''.
This deed was recorded .January 9, 1900, in the office of
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County (defendants'
Exhibit 1). Dr. Straup paid for the premises so conveyed in cash $95.00 and gave his note to Maxwell for
$400.00, the balance of the purchase price, securing the
same by mortgage dated May 26, 1899, recorded .June
5, 1899, (defendants' Exhibit 2) which mortgage was
satisfied by certificate dated January 8, 1900, and
recorded January 9, 1900.

(Defendants' .BJxhibit 3).

Dr. Straup and his neighbors fixed the boundary
between their several premises by agreement made October 23, 1899, which agreement was recorded May 17,
1901 (defendants' Exhibit 4). Dr. Straup did not actually live upon the property, but his possession during
the period of his ownership cannot be questioned upon
the record. Dr. Straup sold the premises to Charles
McCann May 8, 1901, for the sum of $:395.00. The conveyance bearing that date was recorded May 13,1901 (defendants' Exhibit 5).

Mr. McCann actually lived upon

the premises during his ownership thereof and on October 3, 1904, took a quit-claim deed thereto from S.
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Hays and wife for the stated consideratiou of $1.00
(defendants' Exhibit 6), which deed was recorded October 1:2, 1D04. S. Hays was the then reconl owner of
the Valentine Scrip and the quit-claim deed to McCann
is in statutory form. Charles McCiann sold and con\·eycd the premises to A. L. Castleman for the consideration of $900.00 by deed clate<l October 5, 1904 (defendants' "B~xhihit 6-B), which deed was recorded October
] :2, 1904.
Dr. Castleman testified on direct examination ('l'r.
4:2) that there was a two- room cottage on the lot w heu
he bought it, and that he rented the place to one Farrington Carr until

the following spring, when

Dr.

Castleman took possession and built a two-story buildmg on the ground at the cost of about $2000.00. (Tr.
43) As soon as that house was completed Dr. Castleman moved in and continued to live there, using the
premises as his residence and a physician's and surgeon's ofiice or emergency hospital until he sold them
to Dr. C. N. Ray on March 30, 1907, which conveyance
(defendants' ]Jxhibit 7) was recorded May 2;3, 1910.
Dr. Castleman further testified on direct examination that he was then and has been at all times since
a practicing physician and he then took care of the
sick and injured employes of the Utah Copper Company and Boston Consolidated Mining Company in
those days, and has continued in charge of their treatment ever since.

The witness testified that he had had
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a number of associates in his practice; first he had
formed a partnership with Dr. Worthington, then Dr.
C. N. Ray became associated with the partnership, Dr.
Ray residing upon Lot 10, and following Dr. C. N. Ray
and in charge of the business office or hospital were
Drs. D:. H. Ray, 0 'Brien and Frazier, the respondent
Frazier being Dr. Castleman's representative in Bingham at the time of the trial below. (Tr. 44) That during all that time, until and including the time of trial,
Lot 10 and the improvements thereon had been used for
residence and doctors' office and emergency hospital
and the occupation thereof by Dr. Castleman and those
whom he subsequently put in charge there was always
that of the owner of the premises; that duruing that
time none of the McGuires or Gibbons or Tiernan ever
made any demand for possession of the premises, nor
any claim of title with reference thereto, so far as came
to the witness' knowledge. (Tr. 45) After Dr. C. N.
Ray purchased the premises, the latter added four
rooms at the cost of about $2000.00, one of which rooms
was used for an operating room and the three others
had hospital beds, which addition was built in 1908 or
1907. This building burned down and then the lot \Vas
sold to Utah Copper Company, which company built a
residence and office and emergency hospital thereupon
at the cost of $23,000.00, and thereof the witness was
still in charge.
On cross examination Dr. Castleman testified ( Tr.
7:?.

47) that when he purchased from Charles McCann he
did not get an abstract of title nor employ an attorney
to pass on the title for him. It was his recollection that
McCann had procured a deed from S. Hays before he
sold to the witness; that he did not know just what the
Hays deed meant to the title other thau that everybody there seemed to want one. McCann showed him
the deed from Straup or Maxwell or some predecessor
and probably the Hays deed, but the witness asBumcd
the title was all right without investigation, because he
knew the history of the previous occupants for quite a
number of years. (Tr. 48-49).
The testimony of Dr. C. N. Ray (Tr. 51) was much
the same as that of Dr. Castleman. Dr. C. N. Ray purchased Lot 10 March 30, 1907, as hereinbefore stated,
for the sum of $4000.00, and sold it to Dr. Davison H.
Ray and Dr. Bernardo S. 0 'Brien June 30, 1913, the
deed therefor (defendants Exhibit 8) being recorded
November 1, 1913. Dr. Ray testified that during the
period of his ownen;hip none of the McGuires, Gibbons
or Tiernan made any demand upon him for the premises, nor any claim thereto whatever; (Tr. 52) that when
he purchased the property from Dr. Castleman he did
not cause an examination of the title to be made but
simply assumed that Dr. Castleman had a good title
and took it accordingly.
On .July 2, 1913, Drs. D. H. Ray and O'Brien mortgaged (defendants' Exhibit 10) the premises to The
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Oitizens State Bank of Bingham to secure their note
in the principal sum of $3000.00, which mortgage was
recorded .July 5, 191i}, and that

mortgag1~

was discharged

December 1, 1DlA-, and certificate thereof (defendants'
mxhibit 11) was

n~eonled

December f>, 1914.

By deed

dated April 19, 1917 (defendants' Exhibit 9) Dr. Bernardo S. O'Brien and wife conveyed their undivided
one-half

iutere~:;t

in Lot 10 to Dr. Davison H. Hay, which

deud was reconlecl May 10, 1917.

Dr. Davison H. Ray

died and the premises were thereafter on Deeemher

29, 1922, in the course of the probating of his estate, distributed to his widow, Elizabeth K. Ray, the devisee under his will, (plaintiffs' Exhibit A, abstract of title
entry 85) which order of distribution was duly recorded
January 2, 1923.
Imizabeth K. Ray conveyed Uw premises by warranty deed (clufenuants' Exhibit 12) dated November
21, 1922, to respondent R .G. F'razier for the sum of
$7000.00, which deetl was recorded September 19, 1924.

R. G. F'razier antl 'vife conveyed the premises by
warranty deeds (defendants' Exhibits 13 and 14) dated
r8spectively September

:.w,

1~)24,

and October :30, 1924,

which deeds were recorded November 25, 1924.
The proof further shows (Plaintiffs' IjJxhibit A,
Abstract of 'ritle, FJntry No. 16) that the plaintiff Rose
Gibbons on September 20, 1900, by formal power of
attorney appointed Michael Gibbons

ht~l'

agent to tran-

sact all business pertaining· to the McGuire & Company

placer claim, which power of attorney was revoked on
October 16, 1909, by instrument appearing as Entry No.
17 of that abstract. By Entry No. 18 we are informed
appellant Austin K. Tiernan on September 4, 1901, by
formal power of attorney designated Michael Gibbons
his agent in his behalf, of which power of attorney there
has been no revocation. At Entry No. 23 appears a
power of attorney by Lucile Tiernan, the wife of the
appellant Austin K. Tiernan, dated May 1, 1907, likewise formally appointing Michael Gibbons her agent in
this behalf, which power has not been revoked.
Michael Gibbons testified (Tr. 69) that at the
time of the trial below he was about 77 years of age
and (Tr. 58) that he came to Bingham on the
15th day of April, 1874, and resided there ever
since, with the exception of a few years when he
was working in Idaho, and also with the exception of the period from 1910 to 1920, during
which he was in Bingham very little. He further
testified (Tr. 66) that he was one of the owners
of the McGuire & Company placer at the time of
trial.
And on cross-examination (Tr. 69) that during the years from 1910 to 1920 he resided in
Salt Lake City, although during that time he
still had business interests in Bingham, ( Tr. 72)
that when a resident of Bingham Canyon he
lived on the Valentine Scrip near the section
line, seventy-five or eighty feet west of the
westerly side line of the McGuire & Company
placer, this section line being the North boundary
of the Valentine Scrip; he lived there twenty-five
or thirty years, and that was his headquarters
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when he first went to Bingham and continued
to be such (Tr. 73) until the death of his wife
in 1910; that he acquired his interest in the
placer about the year 1898, his present interest
being a three-tenths interest.
And on re-direct examination ('Tr. 74) that
the appellant Rose Gibbons was his sister-in-law;
that while she did not reside in Bingham Canyon she might visit or stay out there a couple of
weeks on a visit or something of that kind, which
would be prior to 1900; that the appellant Tiernan had never resided in Bingham outside of
trips there.
And on re-cross examination (Tr. 81) that
he was there all the years Mr. Maxwell occupied
Lot 10 and saw Mr. Maxwell living on that lot
during all of that time, and he saw Mr. McCann
afterwards living there and had heard that Dr.
Straup had purchased the lot from Maxwell, and
he knew that Dr. Castleman was living there and
had heard that Castleman had bought it, and
after Dr. Castleman he saw Dr. Ray living there
and had heard that he had purchased the premises, but he was not sure that he knew that someone moved in when Dr. C. N. Ray moved out,
although he testified that people might move in
or move out, ( Tr. 82) that he had never served
any notice or interfered with Maxwell, Straup,
McCann, Castleman, C. N. Ray, D. H. Ray,
Frazier or the Utah Copper Company or made
any demand upon them for the property or to
that effect and never asserted any title against
any of them, either on his own behalf or that
of his associates, never said anything to them,
but that during that period he witnessed the
building of those houses and knew of it, (Tr. 83)
and that going up and down the canyon he knew
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that they were enlarging the place when Dr.
Castleman got it, that while Maxwell's holdings
there were very limited they kept on increasing
and increasing until they built this last hospital
which took the fnll width of the patent on the
west side, and (Tr. 90) that in a way all of his
co-tenants kind of looked to him with t·eferencP
to the placer, yet at the same time when he would
stop and visit Mr. Tiernan or give them his
j7tdgment, giving them his ideas of what ought
to be done at the tJ:me, they all seemed to be kind
of indifferent, so after his sister-in-law withdrew her power of attorney, revoked it, October
16, 1!)19, (Plaintiffs Exhibit A, Abstract of Title
Entry No. 17) he j7tst thought that if they wanted to let things .rJo their 'way, let it go.
rrhc possession of the respondents and their predecessors in interest over the past fifty years \Vas of
course open and notorious. The Valentine Scrip patent and the conveyance and mortgages evidencing their
transactions with reference thereto were each promptly
recorded upon the execution thereof, and their several
improvements and changes of possession incident to
their several sales and transfers were likewise ever before the eyes of Michael Gibbons, the agent, and within the knowledge of appellants, actual as well as constructive. It is evident that either appellants did not
think they had a right or they concluded to abandon it.
In our opinion these facts raise an estoppel against the
appellants' attack upon rero;pondents' title. As said in
Godeffroy v. Caldwell, 2 Cal. 489, 56 Am. Dec. 360, 361:
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"It is a well-settled rule of all courts of
equity, that the owner of land who stands by and
sees another sell it, without making known his
claim, is forever estopped from setting up his
title against an innocent purchaser. In strict
analogy to this rule, it is also a familiar principle,
that one who knowingly and silently permits
another to expend money upon land, under a
mistaken impression that he has title, will not
be permitted to set up his right.''
And in Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. South Etc., R. Co.,
84 Ala. 570, 3 South. 286, 5 A. S. R. 401, 407:
"It is a sound and honest rule of f~qui ty,
supported by principles of justice as well as of
public policy, that if one, knowingly though passively suffers another to purchase and spend
money on land, under circumstances which induce an erroneous opinion or mistaken belief of
title, without making known his claim, he shall
not afterwards, in a court of conscience at least,
be permitted to successfully assert any right or
title against the purchaser".
And in 10 R. C. L., § 97, page 782:

" * * * it is a rule almost of universal
application that one who stands by and sees
another purchase land or enter upon it under a
claim of right, and permits such other to make
expenditures or improvements under circumstances which would call for notice or protest,
cannot afterwards assert his own title against
such person, * * * ''
Attention is also respectfully directed to the text
in 21 C. •T. at the pages mentioned, in support of which
a multitude of decisions may there be found. At pages
1154 and 1155 the following:
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''An owner of property who stands by and
sees a third person selling or mortgaging it under claim of title without asserting his own title
or giving t lw purchaser or mortgagee any notice
thereof is estopped, as against sueh purchaser or
mortgagee, from nftorwnnl asserting his title.
And although title does not pass under these circumstances, a eonveyancu will be decreed hy a
court of equity. '~ '~ * "
n t page 11 GO, the following:

"One ~who with lmo,dcdge of the facts awl
without objection suffers another to make improvements or expenditures on, or in connedion
with, l1is property, or in derogation of his rights
under a claim of title or right, will be eRtopped to
deny such tith' or right to tlw prejudice of thai
other who lws ncl<'d in reliane•~ on and been misled hy his eonduct ; * * * "
at page 1166 the following:
"Where a person h<wing a claim sees ~moth
er doing an aet inconsistent therewith, and stanclrl
by in such a manner as to induce the person
doing the act, and who might otherwise have abstained from it, to helieve that ho assents to its
doing, he cannot aftcnvard be he11rd to complain
of it. * * * ''
and at pages

1~16

and el7 the following-:

''Acquiescence as a ddcns(~ lm:.:;, gt'IH'rally
speaking, a dnnl natnre; it rna~~, upon the mw
hand, rest npon the prinriple of ratification, an<l
be denominat(•d 'implie1l rntification' or, upon
the other hawl, rest upon the principle of t~stop
pel, and he d<>llominnted 'cquitnllle estoppel'.
Where a person with actual or constrnetiYc
knowledge of the facts induces another l)y hiR
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words or conduct to believe that he acquiesces in
or ratifies a transaction, or that he will offer no
opposition thereto, and that other, in reliance
on such belief, alters his position, snch person is
estopped from repm1iating the transaction to the
other's prejudice. And this is so regardless of
the particular intent of the party whose acquiescence induces action".
CONCLUSION.
Appellants have neither right, title nor intere>st in
the premises herein involved because ( 1) the Valentine
Scrip patent took the government's title thereto and
the junior placer patent was void, (2) responclents long
ago acquired. by adven;e possession the title to said
premises and appellants' action relative thereto 1s
barred. by the provisions of Sections 6449 and 6450, of
the Compiled Laws of the State of Utah, 1917, and (3)
appellants by their silence and acquiescence over nearly
fifty years last past, with knowledge of the claims of
title by respondents and their predecessors in interest,
their several possessions, sales, purchases, transfers,
mortgages and agreements with reference thereto, the
expenditure of large sums thereupon and the frequent
improvement thereof, arc estopped to deny respondents'
title. Respondents, therefore, are entitled to an
affirmance of the judgment of dismissal made and entered by the court below.
Respectfully submitted,
DICKSON, ELLIS, PARSONS

&

ADAMSON,

Attorneys for Respondents.
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